Around 10 p.m. on Feb. 16, 2024, a 152-car CPKC trail hauling coal from Golden to Revelstoke crashed into the back of a stationary grain train at a speed of 35 kilometres per hour.
Happening at Greely, just a dozen kilometres east of Revelstoke along the Trans-Canada Highway, the coal train's four front-end locomotives ran off the tracks. One of them burst into flames. The four back-end cars on the grain train also derailed, as one caught fire as well and another was crushed under the weight of a locomotive.
Both crew members operating the coal train, No. 805-339, were sent to hospital, one with serious injuries. The grain train, No. 301-230, sustained no injures to its crew farther along the track.
Amid the chaos, flames and 400 tonnes of spilled grain, some 17,500 litres of diesel leaked from the derailed locomotives. It's unknown how much of the fuel burned, but enough spilled to fill a couple backyard pools. It was around -9 C outside.
The 122-car grain train was also bound westward for Revelstoke, having already departed from Field and passed Golden. A delay at Greely had already forced it to wait about an hour while several other trains chugged through eastward toward Golden.
The Transportation Safety Board of Canada, which recently published its report on the February 2024 collision, heard on-board voice recordings from the coal train to better understand what led to this collision.
The report found the coal train's two-person crew exhibited "divided attention" at critical points approaching the grain train. For example, the conductor while calling with the rail traffic controller and writing down numbers missed a key signal his train passed. The signal indicated that the train needed to slow down ("clear to stop") and prepare to stop by the next signal, yet the previous signal indicated the train could continue at its speed ("clear").
Meanwhile, the locomotive engineer diverted his attention between the train controls and the conductor's conversation. The report still maintained that both crew members were qualified for their roles operating the train.
However, the report found that the rail traffic controller complicated the situation by providing "some erroneous cold wheel information," which turned out to be unrelated to the crew's train and which divided their attention and diverted their focus away from the upcoming signal. It notes that such information can become erroneous if multiple trains on adjacent tracks pass the same wheel temperature detector within a few minutes.
"Consequently, the train was accelerating at a critical time when train speed needed to be reduced to comply with the requirements of the upcoming Restricting indication," the report reads. "They were not prepared to stop when the tail end of train 301 came into view."
When the crew did apply their brakes, the report concluded that not enough distance remained for the coal train to stop before striking the grain train.
While the grain train had its air brakes applied, which was normal given that it was stationary, the report notes that this prevented the cars from freely moving along the tracks upon the collision, contributing to their derailment.
"If railway employees are distracted from train operations at times when focus is required to ensure safety, their performance could be negatively affected, increasing the risk of accidents," the report concludes.
Back in April 2024, the Transportation Safety Board of Canada encouraged CPKC by letter to consider revising its procedures, to ensure non-urgent matters are minimized with train crews at critical times.
The report ends by saying CPKC spent the next eight months educating train crews on how to be more aware and attentive of signals, and implementing more supports for crews to accurately determine cold wheel information.
The full report is available at tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/rail/2024/r24c0020/r24c0020.html.
